In September 2014, sites India’s newly elected Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, stood before the world’s business leaders and issued an ambitious clarion call: “Come, Make in India.” The initiative was not merely a policy launch; it was a carefully orchestrated brand campaign aimed at fundamentally repositioning the nation’s economic identity. For decades, India was perceived as a back-office of the world—a hub for information technology and services. “Make in India” sought to transform this narrative, projecting the nation as the next great global factory floor.
A decade later, the initiative presents a complex and nuanced case study in national strategy. It offers invaluable lessons on the power of nation-branding, the painstaking difficulty of structural reform, and the long, arduous journey from ambition to execution. For students of business and strategy, the question is not simply whether “Make in India” succeeded or failed, but what it reveals about the nature of modern industrial policy in a hyper-competitive global economy.
The launch of “Make in India” was a masterclass in strategic communication. The visual identity—a powerful lion logo—was designed not by a government agency, but by an external creative team, signalling a departure from bureaucratic aesthetics. This was a product launch, and the product was India’s future.
The stated objective was audacious: to increase the contribution of the manufacturing sector to India’s GDP from approximately 16% to 25% by 2022, thereby creating millions of jobs for its young population. The government identified four pillars to support this vision:
The implementation of “Make in India” over the subsequent decade has been marked by striking successes and persistent structural challenges.
The Wins: The Low-Hanging Fruit and Strategic Leaps
The initiative’s most immediate impact was on FDI. By clearly signaling openness and undertaking high-profile promotional campaigns, India saw a surge in foreign investment. Between 2014 and 2024, the country attracted USD 667 billion in FDI, accounting for nearly two-thirds of all inflows since economic liberalization began in 1991.
The most celebrated success story is the mobile phone manufacturing sector. Through a combination of FDI liberalization and a phased manufacturing programme that gradually increased tariffs on imported components, the government successfully pressured global giants like Samsung and Apple’s contract manufacturers to set up assembly units. The result was transformative: India went from being a major importer of mobile phones to the world’s second-largest mobile phone manufacturer, producing over 99% of its smartphones domestically.
This sectoral success was bolstered by the introduction of Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes in 2020. Moving beyond simple FDI attraction, PLI schemes offered companies financial incentives for incremental production in 14 key sectors, including electronics, pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and drones. By late 2025, these schemes had attracted investments of nearly ₹1.88 lakh crore and generated over 12 lakh jobs. Furthermore, the government’s focus on strategic autonomy spurred indigenous projects like the Vande Bharat trains and the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, this content signaling a capability leap in high-tech manufacturing.
The Challenges: The Gritty Reality of Reform
Despite these headline-grabbing achievements, the foundational goal of transforming India’s economic structure remained elusive. By 2024, the manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP had stagnated, and by some estimates, had slipped to under 13%—a far cry from the 25% target. Employment in the sector also showed a worrying decline, dropping from 51 million in 2016-17 to just 27 million by 2020-21, a trend exacerbated by the pandemic and increased automation.
Critics argue that the initial focus on branding overshadowed the difficult work of structural reform. While the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking improved dramatically (from 142nd in 2014 to 63rd in 2019), ground-level reality for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) remained challenging. They continued to face a complex web of regulatory obligations, and access to formal credit remained significantly lower than in competing nations like China.
Moreover, exogenous shocks, including the 2016 demonetization and a hastily implemented Goods and Services Tax (GST), disrupted the cash flow and supply chains of small manufacturers, the very backbone of the Indian economy. The long-term decline in Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) as a percentage of GDP also signaled a persistent weakness in investment towards productive assets.
The central tension in the “Make in India” case study is the dichotomy between its success as a branding exercise and its shortcomings as a structural transformation programme. Proponents point to the undeniable influx of FDI and the dominance in sectors like electronics as proof of its success. They argue that the initiative fundamentally changed global perceptions of India, making it a credible alternative to China in the “China Plus One” global supply chain diversification strategy. This is evidenced by Harvard Business School cases, such as the one on Velong, a company strategically moving manufacturing from China to India to mitigate geopolitical risks.
Conversely, detractors argue that the initiative mistook “noise for momentum.” They contend that the focus on flashy announcements and top-down targets created a “slogan without scaffolding,” failing to address the deep-seated issues of land, labour, capital, and logistics that stifle manufacturing growth. The narrative-driven approach, they argue, could not compensate for a lack of a detailed roadmap for developing industrial clusters or a skilled workforce.
As “Make in India” enters its second decade, the strategic question has shifted. The low-hanging fruit of mobile phone assembly has been plucked. The future hinges on moving up the value chain—from “India can assemble” to “India can build.” This requires a focus on deepening the ecosystem: manufacturing components, investing in semiconductor fabrication, and fostering original design and R&D capabilities. The government’s push for the India Semiconductor Mission and its ambitions to produce its first 2nm chip indicate an awareness of this challenge.
The “Make in India” case serves as a powerful reminder that national economic strategy is a marathon, not a sprint. A powerful narrative can open doors and attract initial investment, but sustaining momentum requires a relentless, decade-long commitment to grinding, unglamorous administrative and structural reform. For India, the journey from a roaring slogan to a genuinely roaring factory floor is still very much a work in progress.
Discussion Questions:
